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To the extent this evidence goes to WRTL's subjective intent, it is again irrelevant. No reasonable speaker would choose to run an ad covered by BCRA if its only defense to a criminal prosecution would be that its motives were pure. Austin, 494 U. S., at 660. But one need not look far in our McConnell opinion to understand why we thought that corporations have more than the constrained set of options available to the union leader in Thomas. Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co. Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath. An issue ad is an advertisement on a political subject urging the reader or listener to let a politician know what he thinks, but containing no magic words telling the recipient to vote for or against anyone. McConnell also relied on this interest in upholding regulation not just of express advocacy, but also its "functional equivalent." "The justifications for the regulation of express advocacy," the Court explained, "apply equally" to ads run during the BCRA blackout period "to the extent ... [those ads] are the functional equivalent of express advocacy." Quite the contrary. 435 U. S., at 776-777. Though the principal opinion purports to recognize the "imperative for clarity" in this area of First Amendment law, its attempt to distinguish its test from the test found to be vague in Buckley falls far short. (Unlike the principal opinion, I think that the fair import of the ad in context.). Prior to BCRA, corporations were free under federal law to use independent expenditures to engage in political speech so long as that speech did not expressly advocate the election or defeat of a clearly identified federal candidate. The man reads the morning paper, polishes his shoes, scans through his Rolodex, and does other similar activities. The ban on contributions will mean nothing much, now that companies and unions can save candidates the expense of advertising directly, simply by running "issue ads" without express advocacy, or by funneling the money through an independent corporation like WRTL. The new phrase "electioneering communication" was narrowly defined in BCRA's §201 as "any broadcast, cable, or satellite communication" that. Board of Ed. "16 And just as anyone who heard the Jane Doe ad would understand that the point was to defeat Doe, anyone who heard the Feingold ads (let alone anyone who went to the website they named) would know that WRTL's message was to vote against Feingold. On July 26, 2004, as part of what it calls a "grassroots lobbying campaign," Brief for Appellee 8, WRTL began broadcasting a radio advertisement entitled "Wedding." Id., at 4481.10 The next two elections validated the prediction: during the 1998 cycle, spending on issue ads doubled to between $270 and $340 million, and the figure climbed to $500 million in the 2000 cycle.

But McConnell did not foreclose as-applied challenges to §203, WRTL I, 546 U. S., at 411-412, which brings me back to the present cases. I, §4 of the Constitution until our decision in United States v. Classic, 313 U. S. 299, 317 (1941). Id., at 534. It would naively underestimate the ingenuity and resourcefulness of persons and groups desiring to buy influence to believe that they would have much difficulty devising expenditures that skirted the restriction on express advocacy of election or defeat but nevertheless benefited the candidate's campaign." I join the principal opinion because I conclude (a) that §203 of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, 2 U. S. C. §441b(b)(2) (2000 ed., Supp. alternative." Campaign finance reform has been a series of reactions to documented threats to electoral integrity obvious to any voter, posed by large sums of money from corporate or union treasuries, with no redolence of "grassroots" about them. " Id., at 126-127. See H. Rep. No. Under the circumstances, particularly where WRTL sought another preliminary injunction based on an ad it planned to run during the 2006 blackout period, see 466 F. Supp. (quoting Austin, supra, at 660; citation omitted). First, their content is consistent with that of a genuine issue ad: The ads focus on a legislative issue, take a position on the issue, exhort the public to adopt that position, and urge the public to contact public officials with respect to the matter. See Pipefitters v. United States, 407 U. S. 385, 400 (1972); United States v. Automobile Workers, 352 U. S. 567, 591-592 (1957); CIO, supra, at 110, 124. To the extent it nonetheless suggests that the ads should be interpreted as express advocacy, it falls short. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U. S. 428, 443-444 (2000) (declining to overrule Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (1966), in part because it had become embedded in our national culture). " CED Brief 9. 3, as amended, 88 Stat.

The Court also noted that this case does not present the occasion to revisit McConnell's facial upholding of the EC financing restrictions. McConnell was our latest decision vindicating clear and reasonable boundaries that Congress has drawn to limit " 'the corrosive and distorting effects of immense aggregations of wealth,' " 540 U. S., at 205 (quoting Austin, 494 U. S., at 660), and the decision could claim the justification of ongoing fact as well as decisional history in recognizing Congress's authority to protect the integrity of elections from the distortion of corporate and union funds. Learn more about FindLaw’s newsletters, including our terms of use and privacy policy. " Id., at 82-83. And Yellowtail's response?

of Fla. v. Zarate, 407 U. S. 918 (1972); and Sterrett v. Mothers' & Children's Rights Organization, 409 U. S. 809 (1972)); Miller v. California, 413 U. S. 15 (1973) (overruling Book Named "John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure" v. Attorney General of Mass., 383 U. S. 413 (1966)); Perez v. Campbell, 402 U. S. 637 (1971) (overruling Kesler v. Department of Public Safety of Utah, 369 U. S. 153 (1962)). Three Terms ago, in McConnell, supra, this Court upheld most of BCRA's provisions against constitutional challenge, including §203. They assert that "[s]peech by nonprofit advocacy groups on behalf of their members does not 'corrupt' candidates or 'distort' the political marketplace," and that "[n]onprofit advocacy groups funded by individuals are readily distinguished from for-profit corporations funded by general treasuries." . (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). In this critical area of political discourse, the speaker cannot be compelled to risk felony prosecution with no more assurance of impunity than his prediction that what he says will be found susceptible of some "reasonable interpretation other than as an appeal to vote for or against a specific candidate." Accordingly, I join Parts I and II of today's principal opinion and otherwise concur only in the judgment. Givhan v. Western Line Consol. L. Rev. This would be an uphill fight, after our repeated affirmations that the PAC structure does not impose excessive burdens, ibid. McConnell held, inter alia, that the compelling governmental interest supporting restrictions on corporate expenditures for express advocacy--i.e., Austin's perceived "corrosive and distorting effects of immense aggregations of [corporate] wealth," 540 U. S., at 205--also justified extending those restrictions to ads run during the BCRA blackout period "to the extent ... [they] are the functional equivalent of express advocacy," id., at 206 (emphasis added). in No. Taft-Hartley also specified that the prohibition extends to primary elections, 61 Stat. See Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U. S. 113, 119 (2003). See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, supra, at 269-270. 10-29. 466 F. Supp.

466 F. Supp. " 466 F. Supp. Just before the BCRA blackout, the three-judge District Court denied a preliminary injunction, concluding that McConnell's reasoning that §203 was not facially overbroad left no room for such "as-applied" challenges. Buckley might well have been the last word on limitations on independent expenditures. We therefore have no occasion to reconsider McConnell from first principles. The "vast majority" language, moreover, is beside the point. Id., at 206, n. 88. On re mand, the district court held by a divided decision that BCRA § 203 is unconstitutional as applied to the 2004 advertisements and granted summary judgment to appellee. When the election was over, the activities ended. See Consolidated Edison Co. of N. Y. v. Public Serv. Though candidate-centered issue ads always made up a majority of issue ads, as the election approached the percent [of] candidate-centered spots increased ... such that by the last two months before the election almost all televised issue spots made a case for or against a candidate." Not until 1947, with the enactment of the Taft-Hartley amendments to the Federal Corrupt Practices Act, 1925, did Congress even purport to regulate campaign-related expenditures of corporations and unions. We reach the same conclusion.9. 540 U. S., at 205-206. "[P]olitical money ... is a moving target," Issacharoff & Karlan, The Hydraulics of Campaign Finance Reform, 77 Tex. 02-1674, p. 3 (hereinafter CED Brief). 22, 25. How did the Court manage to reach this result without overruling Bellotti? In any event, a group can certainly choose to run an issue ad to coincide with public interest rather than a floor vote.

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