jones v united states 1983

"Congress has determined that a criminal defendant found not guilty by reason of insanity in the District of Columbia should be committed indefinitely to a mental institution for treatment and the protection of society. Petitioner has not sought appellate review of the Superior Court's findings in 1976 and 1977 that he remained mentally ill and dangerous, and, indeed, the record does not indicate that, since 1977, he ever has sought a release hearing -- a hearing to which he was entitled every six months. Petitioners contend that, regardless of whether the IRS properly concluded that racially discriminatory private schools violate public policy, only Congress can alter the scope of 170 and 501(c)(3). In 1924, this Court restated the common understanding of the charitable exemption provision: Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U. S. 684 (1975). the Internal Revenue Service is invested with authority to decide which public policies are sufficiently “fundamental” to require denial of tax exemptions, On that basis, he demanded that he be released unconditionally or recommitted pursuant to the civil commitment procedures under the District of Columbia Code, including a jury trial and clear and convincing proof by the Government of his mental illness and dangerousness. Few cases would call for more caution in finding ratification by acquiescence than the present ones. [461 The inherent fallacy of relying on a criminal sanction to determine the length of a therapeutic confinement is manifested by petitioner's failure to suggest any clear guidelines for deciding when a patient must be released. These are but a few of numerous Executive Orders over the past three decades demonstrating the commitment of the Executive Branch to the fundamental policy of eliminating racial discrimination. The same District Court, however, later ruled that racially segregated social clubs could receive tax exemptions under 501(c)(7) of the Code. See McGlotten v. Connally, 338 F. Supp. Prob. U.S. 367, 382 Reg. . The form of 170 simply makes plain what common sense and history tell us: in enacting both 170 and Inmates of mental institutions, like prisoners, are deprived of unrestricted association with friends, family, and community; they must contend with locks, guards, and detailed regulation of their daily activities. The court also rejected Goldsboro's arguments that denial of tax-exempt status violated the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses of the First Amendment.   404 1977) (hereinafter Bogert). 7805(a); and this Court has long recognized the primary authority of the IRS and its predecessors in construing the Internal Revenue Code, see, e. g., Commissioner v. Portland Cement Co. of Utah, NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 27.

See also Reynolds v. United States, Indeed, were we writing prior to the history detailed in the Court's opinion, this could well be the construction I would adopt. [1], Indefinite commitment of an insanity acquittee, based on proof of insanity by only a preponderance of the evidence, comports with due process. The exemption remained unchanged in the Revenue Acts of 1924, 1926, 1928, and 1932. Therefore, I cannot agree with the Court that petitioner in this case has any less interest in procedural protections during the commitment process than the petitioners in Addington, O'Connor, or Baxtrom, and I cannot agree that the risks of error which an indefinite commitment following an insanity acquittal entails are sufficiently diminished to justify relieving the Government of the responsibilities defined in Addington.

The question is not whether "government may not act in the face of this uncertainty," ante at 463 U. S. 365, n. 13; everyone would agree that it can. 92-318, 86 Stat. 172. Order No. Cornell University Law School, Legal Information Institute, No. In view of its prolonged and acute awareness of so important an issue, Congress’ failure to act on the bills proposed on this subject provides added support for concluding that Congress acquiesced in the IRS rulings of 1970 and 1971. The IRS then concluded that a school that promotes racial discrimination violates public policy and therefore cannot qualify as a common-law charity. However, because an insanity acquittee was not convicted, he may not be punished. U.S. 490 Accordingly, the court entered summary judgment for the IRS on its counterclaim.

In the early 1970s, the procedures began to be examined legally on constitutional as well as therapeutic grounds. Petitioner next contends that his indefinite commitment is unconstitutional because the proof of his insanity was based only on a preponderance of the evidence, as compared to, Addington's civil commitment requirement of proof by clear and convincing evidence. J. Monahan, The Clinical Prediction of Violent Behavior 71, 80-81 (NIMH 1980) (Monahan); see, e.g., Cocozza, Melick, & Steadman, Trends in Violent Crime Among Ex-Mental Patients, 16 Criminology 317 (1978) (Cocozza); Pasewark, Pantle, & Steadman, The Insanity Plea in New York State, 51 N.Y.St.B.J. Those amendments, however, are directly concerned only with limiting more aggressive enforcement procedures proposed by the IRS in 1978 and 1979 and preventing the adoption of more stringent substantive standards. Prior to 1954, public education in many places still was conducted under the pall of From 1971 to May, 1975, the University accepted no applications from unmarried Negroes, [n5] but did accept applications from Negroes married within their race. Indeed, this concrete evidence generally may be at least as persuasive as any predictions about dangerousness that might be made in a civil commitment proceeding.

It is, of course, not unknown for independent agencies or the Executive Branch to misconstrue the intent of a statute; Congress can and often does correct such misconceptions, if the courts have not done so.

NLRB v. Boeing Co., As in Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U. S. 660, 461 U. S. 665 (1983), "[d]ue process and equal protection principles converge in the Court's analysis of these cases," and under our current understanding of the meaning of these Clauses, it is perhaps more appropriate to focus primarily on due process considerations. I would emphasize, however, that the balancing of these substantial interests is for Congress to perform. The Solicitor of Internal Revenue looked to the common law of charitable trusts in construing that provision, and noted that "generally bequests for the benefit and advantage of the general public are valid as charities." Both the courts and the Internal Revenue Service have long recognized that the statutory requirement of being “organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, .

. Those amendments, however, are directly concerned only with limiting more aggressive enforcement procedures proposed by the IRS in 1978 and 1979 and preventing the adoption of more stringent substantive standards. 94-1353, p. 8 (1976). 1, 101(6), 53 Stat. L. 88-352, 78 Stat. [ [461 498, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. -386 (1983); United States v. Rutherford, 241, 42 U.S.C. Petitioners argue that the plain language of the statute guarantees them tax-exempt status. Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. at 406 U. S. 738; McNeil v. Director, Patuxent Institution, 407 U. S. 245, 407 U. S. 249 (1972). . As we noted earlier, few issues have been the subject of more vigorous and widespread debate and discussion in and out of Congress than those related to racial segregation in education. 487, stated that the 501(c)(3) exemption was available only to institutions that served "the specified charitable purposes," H. R. Rep. No. ., giving special emphasis to the Christian religion and the ethics revealed in the Holy Scriptures." 81-1, p. 10, but seeks to justify those policies on grounds we have fully discussed. These include hearings in February 1982, after we granted review in this case. It is true that, in Addington and in Vitek v. Jones, 445 U. S. 480 (1980), we recognized that individuals have an interest in not being stigmatized by society at large on account of being labeled mentally ill. 441 U.S. at 441 U. S. 426; 445 U.S. at 445 U. S. 492. These amendments therefore do not indicate congressional rejection of Revenue Ruling 71-447 and the standards contained therein. 448 (DC 1972). 314 At that time, he should have received the benefit of the Addington due process standards, and, because he did not, the findings at that hearing cannot provide constitutionally adequate support for his present commitment. 73-74 (1970); 432 A.2d at 371 ("[T]he District of Columbia statutory scheme for commitment. a [private] school not having a racially nondiscriminatory policy as to students is not ‘charitable’ within the common law concepts reflected in sections 170 and 501(c)(3) of the Code. In view of this concern, the Court deemed it inappropriate to ask the individual "to share equally with society the risk of error." [461 Ch. (1965). . 1127, appeal dism’d sub nom. at 406 U. S. 729-730. 91-907, supra, at 74 (expressing fear that "dangerous criminals, particularly psychopaths, [may] win acquittals of serious criminal charges on grounds of insanity" and yet "escape hospital commitment"); S.Rep.

Surely Congress had no thought of affording such an unthinking, wooden meaning to 170 and 501(c)(3) as to provide tax benefits to "educational" organizations that do not serve a public, charitable purpose. The institution's purpose must not be so at odds with the common community conscience as to undermine any public benefit that might otherwise be conferred. .”); id. 159, III-1 Cum.Bull. 559, 562, 576-577, reflect congressional opposition to the IRS policy formalized in Revenue Ruling 71-447.

The Court found no constitutional infirmity in “excluding [Jehovah’s Witness children] from doing there what no other children may do.” Id. That is, if the Due Process Clause does not require that an insanity acquittee be given the particular procedural safeguards provided in a civil commitment hearing under Addington, then there necessarily is a rational basis for equal protection purposes for distinguishing between civil commitment and commitment of insanity acquitees. Ante at 463 U. S. 366. Under the District of Columbia Code, a criminal defendant may be acquitted by reason of insanity if his insanity is affirmatively established by a preponderance of the evidence. Footnote 7 Although this Court has never approved the practice, it is possible that an inmate will be given medication for reasons that have more to do with the needs of the institution than with individualized therapy. 639 F.2d 147, 155 (CA4 1980) (emphasis in original). [n32] 448

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