us v bagley quimbee

After an adverse court ruling that this policy of excluding women violated the Equal Protection Clause, VMI created an alternative program for women known as the Virginia Women’s Institute for Leadership (VWIL).

136, 145 (1964).   Similarly, in Ashley v. Texas, 319 F.2d 80 (CA5), cert. Footnote 11 disclosure only enhances the quest for truth; it takes no direct toll on that inquiry. U.S. 499, 516 13a. Second, persistent or egregious failure to comply with the constitutional duty could lead to disciplinary actions by the courts. Id., at 111. denied, 427 U.S. 85, 86 But Mr. Bagley may have been in the living room when the protective sweep began. VMI refused to admit women. at 360 U. S. 271. Ibid. Ante at 473 U. S. 682. Trial counsel based his defense on temporary insanity at the time of the murder. In addition, unlike police, defense counsel generally is not present at the scene of the crime, or at the time of arrest, but instead comes into the case late. (1974)) (emphasis added by Court of Appeals). . Evidence favorable to an accused and relevant to the dispositive issue of guilt apparently may still be found not "material," and hence suppressible by prosecutors prior to trial, unless there is a reasonable probability that its use would result in an acquittal. A reviewing court should attach great significance to silence in the face of a specific request, when responsive evidence is later shown to have been in the Government's possession. Cf. (1963). See, e.g., Pyle v. Kansas, 317 U. S. 213, 317 U. S. 215-216 (1942) (allegation that imprisonment resulted from perjured testimony and deliberate suppression by authorities of evidence favorable to him "charge a deprivation of rights guaranteed by the Federal Constitution"). U.S. 667, 680] If defense counsel had known before trial what the eyewitness had seen, he might have relied on an additional defense, and he might have emphasized the struggle. In particular, it disagreed with the Government's - and the District Court's - premise that the testimony of O'Connor and Mitchell was exculpatory on the narcotics charges, and that respondent therefore would not have sought to impeach "his own witness." 279, 289-290 (disputing a similar argument).

In Davis, the defense sought to cross-examine a crucial prosecution witness concerning his probationary status as a juvenile delinquent. Before trial, counsel for Bagley had filed a detailed discovery motion requesting, among other things, "any deals, promises or inducements made to witnesses in exchange for their testimony." It is clear that the term "material" has an evidentiary meaning quite distinct from that which the Court attributes to it. for Cert. .'". .

The prosecutor, convinced of the guilt of the defendant and of the truthfulness of his witnesses, may all too easily view as irrelevant or unpersuasive evidence that draws his own judgments into question. We have other mechanisms for disciplining unscrupulous defense counsel; hamstringing their clients need not be one of them. [Footnote 1] The Government's two principal witnesses at the trial were James F. O'Connor and Donald E. Mitchell. He also found that on January 4, 1978, following the trial and decision in respondent's case, ATF made payments of $300 to both O'Connor and Mitchell pursuant to the contracts. Footnote 9 -517 (1983) (STEVENS, J., concurring in judgment).

I think they might have been mistaken. JUSTICE MARSHALL rightly criticizes the incentives such a standard creates for prosecutors "to gamble, to play the odds, and to take a chance that evidence will later turn out not to have been potentially dispositive." JUSTICE POWELL took no part in the decision of this case. U.S. 667, 710] In such a case, there simply is no need to consider -- in light of the evidence that actually was presented and the quantity of evidence to support the verdict returned -- the possible effect of the information on the particular jury that heard the case. [ After describing the withheld evidence as "relevant" and "pertinent," 195 F.2d at 819, the court concluded: "We think that the conduct of the Commonwealth as outlined in the instant case is in conflict with our fundamental principles of liberty and justice. denied, 345 U.S. 904 (1953), the appeals court granted a petition for habeas corpus in a case in which the State had withheld from the defendant evidence that might have mitigated his punishment. Accordingly he will decide the evidence need not be disclosed. in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done.". 1117, but the court rejected the proposition: Nor is this case unique. The court noted that the District Judge who had presided over the bench trial. Ante at 473 U. S. 682. The District Court reasoned that O'Connor's and Mitchell's testimony was exculpatory on the narcotics charges. U.S. 97 If he possesses this right, he must bring forward proof of those declarations. JUSTICE MARSHALL, with whom JUSTICE BRENNAN joins, dissenting. It does not establish a standard of materiality because it does not indicate what quantum of likelihood there must be that the undisclosed evidence would have affected the outcome. (1984), simply falls "outside the Brady context." "[T]he truth-seeking process is corrupted by the withholding of evidence favorable to the defense, regardless of whether the evidence is directly contradictory to evidence offered by the prosecution.". ", "The proper standard of materiality must reflect our overriding concern with the justice of the finding of guilt. These key witnesses, it turned out, were each to receive monetary rewards whose size was contingent on the usefulness of their assistance. The Brady rule is based on the requirement of due process. The foregoing statement, as to which the Court remands for further consideration, is seriously flawed on its face. 373 The defense was free to cross-examine the witnesses on any relevant subject, including possible bias or interest resulting from inducements made by the Government. U.S., at 154 467

Footnote 5 U.S. 667, 694] Respondent was indicted on charges of violating federal narcotics and firearms statutes.   Consistent with "our overriding concern with the justice of the finding of guilt." In Brady, the suppressed confession was inadmissible as to guilt and "could not have affected the outcome" on that issue. disclosure only enhances the quest for truth; it takes no direct toll on that inquiry. "Materiality looks to the relation between the propositions for which the evidence is offered and the issues in the case. Brady, of course, reflects the latter goal of justice, and is in some ways at odds with the competing model of a sporting event. In 1977, the two guards, O'Connor and Mitchell, worked for the Milwaukee Railroad; for about three years, they had been social acquaintances of Bagley, with whom they often shared coffee breaks. Id. U.S., at 106 The motion came before the same District Judge who had presided at respondent's bench trial. Although the prosecutor's failure to respond fully to a specific request may impair the adversary process by having the effect of representing to the defense that certain evidence does not exist, this possibility of impairment does not necessitate a different standard of materiality. ", "We now consider whether the prosecutor has any constitutional duty to volunteer exculpatory matter to the defense, and if so, what standard of materiality gives rise to that duty. Id., at 112. . Finally, the Court held that it was not bound by the state court's determination that the false testimony "could not in any reasonable likelihood have affected the judgment of the jury." At the same time, the Court rejected a standard that would require the defendant to demonstrate that the evidence if disclosed probably would have resulted in acquittal. In the present case, the prosecutor failed to disclose evidence that the defense might have used to impeach the Government's witnesses by showing bias or interest. (1953), the appeals court granted a petition for habeas corpus in a case in which the State had withheld from the defendant evidence that might have mitigated his punishment. 427

(1982), the Court held that due process is violated when testimony is made unavailable to the defense by Government deportation of witnesses "only if there is a reasonable likelihood that the testimony could have affected the judgment of the Pp. Third, the standard of harmlessness I adopt is more protective of the defendant than that chosen by the Court, placing the burden on the prosecutor, rather than the defendant, to prove the harmlessness of his actions. This proposition is not new. (1963), the defendant was sentenced to death for murder.

. First, I see no significant difference for truth-seeking purposes between the Giglio situation and this one; for the same reasons I believe the result must therefore be the same here as in Giglio, see supra, at 691-692, I also believe the standard for reversal should be the same. 375 To the contrary, a rule simplifying the disclosure decision by definition does not make that decision more complex. . Evidence that is of doubtful worth in the eyes of the prosecutor could be of inestimable value to the defense, and might make the difference to the trier of fact. [473 Brady v. Maryland, Thompson v. Dye, 221 F.2d 763, 765 (CA3), cert. In particular, the Court of Appeals appears to have disagreed with the factual premise on which this finding expressly was based. After describing the withheld evidence as "relevant" and "pertinent," 195 F.2d, at 819, the court concluded: "We think that the conduct of the Commonwealth as outlined in the instant case is in conflict with our fundamental principles of liberty and justice.

Id., at 272. Second, only a strict appellate standard, which places on the prosecutor a burden to defend his decisions, will remove the incentive to gamble on a finding of harmlessness. concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that disclosure of the ATF agreement would not have affected the outcome. But see Babcock, Fair Play: Evidence Favorable to an Accused and Effective Assistance of Counsel, 34 Stan. Id., at 108, 112. ." On cross-examination, respondent's counsel did not seek to discredit their testimony as to the facts of distribution, but rather sought to show that the controlled substances in question came from supplies that had been prescribed for respondent's personal use. 123 F. Supp. Formulation of this right, and imposition of this duty, are "the essence of due process of law.

App. . U.S. 97, 121 David A. Strauss argued the cause for the United States. U.S. 83, 87

Id., at 1464. could not have been harmless. The form was entitled "Contract for Purchase of Information and Payment of Lump Sum Therefor," and provided that the Bureau would, "upon the accomplishment of the objective sought to be obtained .

Id., at 694. Instead, in acknowledgment of the fact that important interests are served when potentially favorable evidence is disclosed, the Court has fashioned a compromise, requiring that the prosecution identify and disclose to the defendant favorable material that it possesses. The Court again reaffirmed this principle in Napue v. Illinois, 360 U. S. 264 (1959). .

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